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THE 9/11 LITIGATION DATABASE: A RECIPE 
FOR JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 
ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN
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JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.

 
AARON D. TWERSKI

 
The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, 
presented the American legal system with unprecedented challenges 
regarding whether, and how, to compensate those who suffered harm as a 
result. Congress stepped in almost immediately to provide a victims’ 
compensation fund that dealt primarily with those who were directly and 
immediately affected.
1
 But many other harms manifested later. In the 
months that followed as many as 60,000 persons came to the World Trade 
Center (WTC) to aid in what amounted to around-the-clock rescue, 
recovery, and debris removal at the WTC site.
2
 Of that number, over 
10,000 responders filed tort claims for injuries they claimed to have 
suffered as a result of exposure to contaminants at the site.
3
 Aside from 
workers’ compensation and disability insurance, their lawsuits in federal 
court were their only means by which to seek damages for their injuries. 
No one questions that the atmosphere around the WTC site was a toxic 
cocktail of epic proportions, especially in the earlier months.
4
 Plaintiffs’ 
complaints set forth claims of negligence, violation of safe-place statutes, 
and failure to disclose the true nature of the relevant risks.
5
 The plaintiff-
 
 
  Senior United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York. 
  Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
  Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
 Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski have served as special masters to Judge 
Alvin K. Hellerstein in the 9/11 first responders’ litigation since December 12, 2006. As this issue 
goes to press, they continue to serve in that capacity. 
 The authors gratefully acknowledge the outstanding research assistance of Shimon Sternhell 
(Brooklyn 2012) and William Ralph, law clerk to Judge Hellerstein on this project. 
 1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 
(2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). In December 2010, Congress created a 
supplemental compensation fund to disburse $2.775 billion dollars and various health benefits to a 
broad range of victims, including bystanders. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 
2010, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,027, 36,028 (proposed June 21, 2011) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 4). 
 2. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
ANTHONY DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST 217 (2010). 
 3. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); WTC Captive Ins. Co., v. 
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 619, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 4. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27. 
 5. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2008); In re World 
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
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responders wound up alleging over 380 different injuries arising from their 
exposures.
6
 They claimed that the City of New York (the City), the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, four prime contractors and 
hundreds of subcontractors were liable to them in tort.
7
 Congress assigned 
all of these responder claims to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York,
8
 and the cases were ultimately 
consolidated before Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, who presided over all of 
the tort claims arising from the 9/11 attacks.
9
 An article entitled 
Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, coauthored by 
Judge Hellerstein and Special Masters Henderson and Twerski, recently 
published in the Cornell Law Review, contains a comprehensive analysis 
of the 9/11 litigation and ultimate settlement.
10
 This Article will focus and 
enlarge on one aspect of that subject, the creation of a program of core 
discovery and a database to gather and maintain information about all 
10,000 claimants. The function of the database was to aid the court and the 
parties to manage discovery and to choose cases for further and intensive 
discovery and early trial in order to make it possible for the parties to 
negotiate a comprehensive settlement of the massive litigation. 
I. WHY A DATABASE? 
No judge and no set of attorneys can simultaneously litigate 10,000 
cases alleging so many different injuries. In large-scale pharmaceutical 
drug cases, typically the plaintiffs allege that ingesting the drug caused 
only a limited number of ailments.
11
 Attorneys choose representative cases 
 
 
 6. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 7. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 529. The site was divided into 
four quadrants with a primary contractor assigned to each quadrant. Id. The primary contractors were 
Tully Construction (Zone 1), Bovis Lend Lease (Zone 2), AMEC (Zone 3), and Turner Construction 
(Zone 4). Id. The primary contractors in turn entered into subcontracts with over 140 specialty 
subcontractors that were needed to provide various services to complete the recovery effort. Id.; see 
also Overview of the World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process Agreement, As Amended 
[hereinafter Overview of Settlement Process], available at http://www.877wtchero.com/docs/Overview 
-of-the-World-Trade-Center-Litigation-Settlement-Process-Agreement-As-Amended.pdf (providing a 
complete listing of the subcontractor defendants). 
 8. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408, 115 Stat. 
230, 241 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). 
 9. Robin J. Effron, Disaster-Specific Mechanisms for Consolidation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2423, 
2428 (2008). 
 10. Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Managerial Judging: 
The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig, 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780 (E.D. La. 2007) 
(discussing plaintiffs’ claims arising from heart attacks suffered after taking Vioxx); Edward F. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/3
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for trial and, after some experience with litigation, the parties are able to 
value the cases based on such metrics as length of exposure and severity of 
injury.
12
 From discovery and the trial results in handfuls of bellwether 
cases, each side learns the vulnerability of the other on such issues as 
liability, causation, and size of recovery.
13
 These lessons apply without 
great difficulty to the larger number of claims remaining in the 
litigations.
14
 No such path was available to Judge Hellerstein in the 9/11 
context.
15
 The wide range of injuries alleged, including the varying 
locations and lengths of exposures, the dizzying array of prior medical 
histories, the differences in the types of protective equipment provided and 
the efficacy of their use made the task of retrieving and managing 
information very complex and difficult.
16
 Furthermore, Judge Hellerstein, 
realizing that this was public litigation that touched raw nerves in the 
American psyche, was intent on assuring that the relevant information was 
available not only to the court and to the parties but to the general public 
as well. Information had to be retrieved and presented in ways that 
allowed all who sought access to it to understand its import. Transparency 
was more than a slogan. It reflected a deeply held conviction about the 
management of the cases.
17
 
As a practical matter, what did all of this mean? At the outset, Judge 
Hellerstein hoped that more specific pleadings might provide sufficient 
information to help structure discovery.
18
 However, the federal rules 
governing pleadings aim primarily at providing fair notice of the basic 
 
 
Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action is not Possible, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 2205, 2207 (2008) (noting that plaintiffs claimed that Vioxx caused strokes and heart attacks). 
 12. Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 
2324, 2332 (2008). 
 13. See id. at 2337. 
 14. See id. 
 15. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting 
that “[t]here were few precedents, perhaps none,” to guide Judge Hellerstein in managing the 
September 11th litigation). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Judge Hellerstein’s paper at a seminar at Columbia Law School, led and organized by Senior 
U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, focused on this topic. See Alvin K. Hellerstein, 
Democratization of Mass Tort Litigation: Presiding Over Mass Tort Litigation to Enhance 
Participation and Control by the People Whose Claims are Being Asserted, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 473 (2012). For an outgrowth of this paper, see Alvin K. Hellerstein, Democratization of Mass 
Tort Litigation: Judicial Management to Enhance Claimants’ Participation and Control, THE BRIEF: 
TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION, Summer 2012, at 16. 
 18. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100, 2006 WL 3858393, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2006) (order granting motion for leave to amend plaintiffs’ master complaint); 
Transcript of Status Conference at 24–25, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 102 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007). 
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nature of the claims being asserted rather than imposing legal structure on 
those claims.
19
 Thus, federal civil pleading requirements are relatively lax 
and, in the 9/11 litigation, did not help to provide the court with sufficient 
information even to begin to think about settlement.
20
 Working in 
conjunction with the Special Masters (co-authors Henderson and Twerski), 
Judge Hellerstein developed core discovery questions that all parties were 
obligated to answer.
21
 The core discovery order asked for information on 
such items as the specific work performed by each plaintiff, the 
availability and use of personal protective equipment, and the nature and 
severity of the injuries allegedly suffered by each plaintiff.
22
 Although the 
answers to these questions provided information about a number of issues, 
it was not possible, informally and intuitively, to correlate information 
from 10,000-plus plaintiffs and hundreds of defendants.
23
 It became clear 
that the only way that anyone could get their arms around the factual 
complexities of this case was to construct an electronically searchable 
database.
24
 
A. The Severity Chart 
From the outset Judge Hellerstein made it clear to the Special Masters 
and the parties that his priority was to see to it that those most seriously 
harmed would receive the highest awards.
25
 This desire had to be tempered 
by the realities of tort law. To the extent that some plaintiffs could not 
causally relate their injuries to exposures at the WTC site, recoveries 
would have to be adjusted downward to reflect the weak causal links. 
Nonetheless, severity of injury rather than nuances regarding causation 
became the watchword for recovery. Implementing that commitment 
proved to be no easy task. 
Designing a Severity Chart correlating major types of injury with levels 
of relative severity was difficult for several reasons. Out of the 380 
different injuries alleged, it was necessary to choose those that were 
 
 
 19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (noting that a 
complaint requires “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
 20. See Transcript of Status Conference at 15, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 
MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007). 
 21. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
Clarifying Order Regulating Discovery, No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007). 
 22. Clarifying Order Regulating Discovery, No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007). 
 23. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100, 2008 WL 793578, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (order appointing technical advisor). 
 24. See id. 
 25. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 503. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/3
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sufficiently important to be included on a Severity Chart of manageable 
length.
26
 Second, objective criteria for evaluating the relative severity of 
injury had to be identified. Third, an injury rated as relatively severe for 
one ailment might be far less severe than an ostensibly lower rating for a 
different ailment. 
Aware of the scientific literature that had been published following the 
9/11 disaster
27
 and mindful of the answers previously given to core 
discovery questions, the court and the Masters concluded that a variety of 
different respiratory diseases were the most frequent and plausible 
illnesses reflected in plaintiffs’ complaints.28 In addition, large numbers of 
plaintiffs complained of rhinosinisitus and gastroesophageal reflux 
(GERD).
29
 As for objective criteria by which to evaluate the severity of 
injury, fortunately the American Medical Association and the American 
Thoracic Society publish helpful severity ratings. These ratings are relied 
upon in a variety of nontort compensation contexts
30
 for all of the diseases 
included in the Severity Chart. 
Working out cross-injury comparisons proved to be especially difficult. 
Ultimately, counsel came up with their own evaluations for injuries within 
each category. Because Judge Hellerstein desired that consensus be 
reached and made clear that he would rely on the rankings once 
established, negotiating the Severity Chart with counsel was no easy 
matter. Defense counsel expressed concern that the “objective” diagnostic 
tests relied on to determine the presence of disease were subject to great 
variation, depending not only on the integrity and expertise of those 
administering the tests but also on the pre-test conduct of the plaintiffs. 
For example, results from breathing tests designed to measure lung 
capacity could vary significantly depending on whether the plaintiff 
smoked immediately, or shortly, before the test. Medical records were 
often silent on such matters. Was it sufficient to test for GERD by 
endoscopy or was a more reliable, albeit more costly, MRI required? Was 
it necessary to have a confirming diagnosis by a physician interpreting the 
 
 
 26. Transcript of Status Conference at 6–8, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 
MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008). 
 27. See, e.g., G. Moscato & M.R. Yacoub, World Trade Center Disaster: Short- and Medium-
Term Health Outcome, 67 MONALDI ARCHIVE FOR CHEST DISEASE 154 (2007); Jonathan M. Samet et 
al., The Legacy of World Trade Center Dust, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2233 (2007). 
 28. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 531–33. The illnesses listed on 
the Severity Chart were COPD, emphysema, insterstitial lung disease, asthma, RADS, laryngitis, 
pharyngitis, chronic rhinosinusitis, GERD, Barrett’s esophagus, gastritis, esophagitis, and GI stricture. 
Id. 
 29. Id. at 532–33. 
 30. Id. at 503. 
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test results?
31
 Answers to these and a number of other questions had to be 
negotiated. When agreement could not be reached, Judge Hellerstein 
decided the issue after considering the positions of the parties and the 
recommendations of the Special Masters. 
B. Constructing the Database 
As noted earlier, the 9/11 responders’ litigation differed significantly 
from traditional mass tort litigation arising out of injuries caused by 
prescription drugs.
32
 Although cases were sampled in both types of 
litigation, the methodologies and purposes of sampling differed 
substantially. In the 9/11 litigation, the database program enabled the court 
and counsel to acquire information on all 10,000 cases, not just a sampled 
few, and allowed the court to participate fully and to manage the sampling 
process. By creating a sufficiently reliable and comprehensive database 
that was inclusive of all parties and accessible to all attorneys, the profiles 
for each individual plaintiff would provide substantial information on a 
host of issues that might be helpful in valuing cases and enabling a more 
intelligent sampling process to identify cases that would merit further and 
more intensive proceedings and trials.
33
 
More importantly, the ability to perform Boolean searches covering 
thousands of plaintiff files allowed the Special Masters to determine 
interrelationships between and among responses. For example, not only 
could the age distributions of plaintiffs, the frequencies and severities of 
each type of disease, and the variety and frequency among plaintiffs’ pre-
existing medical conditions be determined; but it was possible to identify 
correlations between the ages of plaintiffs and the severities of injuries 
suffered and whether the length of the plaintiffs’ exposure to the WTC site 
increased the severity of injury. Thus, by adding or subtracting from the 
criteria reflected in the various fields one could discern which factors 
strongly correlated with the severity of injury and which factors had a 
lesser impact, or no impact at all. 
To aid in choosing and modifying the software necessary to accomplish 
these objectives and to enter and maintain the data, the Special Masters 
hired computer specialists who also assisted in designing and executing 
 
 
 31. For Judge Hellerstein and the Special Masters’ consideration of this question, see Transcript 
of Status Conference, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 
2008). 
 32. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 500. 
 33. Id. at 502, 507–22; In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100, 2008 WL 
793578, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (order appointing technical advisor). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/3
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the relevant searches.
34
 These approaches to the data provided critical 
information at important stages of the litigation. First, and most important, 
it became clear fairly early that less than 25 percent of the claimants had 
suffered serious injury and that almost a third suffered no injury at all.
35
 
Moreover, many of those who claimed to have suffered injuries that could 
generally be categorized as serious would likely wind up at the lower end 
of the severity scale.
36
 
A particular difficulty arose with regard to cancer cases. Because of the 
long latency periods between exposure and the onset of cancer, there was a 
lack of evidence linking exposure to the WTC toxics to the cancers 
suffered by the plaintiffs.
37
 This later became a gut-wrenching problem, 
given that the cancer sufferers and their families and survivors were 
convinced that their cancers resulted from WTC work.
38
 Even now, after 
further study, the evidence remains problematic regarding whether specific 
cancers can be tied to the toxic substances ambient in the WTC work site, 
or even if there were increases in cancers by those exposed to those 
substances at the work site.
39
 
In any event, within two years from the start of the computer-assisted 
phase of discovery, it was possible to conclude with some confidence that 
the one billion dollars that FEMA had set aside for defense against and 
payment of tort claims against the City and its contractors, together with 
 
 
 34. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 2008 WL 793578, at *1 (No. 21 MC 100). With 
the aid the Timothy Opsitnick, the Special Masters hired Technology Concepts and Design, Inc. to 
build and operate the electronic database. Id. 
 35. Memorandum from James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Special Masters, to Judge 
Alvin K. Hellerstein (Sept. 24, 2009) (docketed in 21 MC 100, June 23, 2010) [hereinafter Memo from 
Special Masters (Sept. 24)]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Transcript of Status Conference at 17, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 
100 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010); see also Transcript of Status Conference at 59, In re World Trade Ctr. 
Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010); Experts Say Science Lacking on 9/11-
Cancer Link, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE, June 23, 2012, at B6; David B. Caruso & Michael Stobbe, 
9/11 Cancer Link Lacks Scientific Evidence, Experts Say, HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2012, 5:43 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/20/911-cancer-link-lacks-sci_n_1611666.html. 
 38. See, e.g., Tom Leonard, Donna Summer said toxic dust from 9/11 gave her fatal lung cancer, 
MAIL ONLINE, (May 20, 2012, 5:39 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2146629/Donna-
Summer-said-cancer-caused-dust-9-11.html; Andrew Siff, 9/11 Dust Raised Cancer Risk: Study, NBC 
NEW YORK (September, 6 2011, 6:33 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Cancer-Deaths-
September-11-Studies-128923278.html. 
 39. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Sept. 11 Health Fund Given Clearance to Cover Cancer, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/nyregion/ruling-to-allow-9-11-health 
-fund-to-cover-cancers.html?pagewanted=all; Science lacking on 9/11 and cancer, experts say, USA 
TODAY (June 21, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/story/2012-06-21/sept11-can 
cer-wtc/55737174/1. 
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accumulated interest, would allow for a reasonable settlement of the 
thousands of cases before the court.
40
 
The database was also useful in choosing which plaintiffs should be 
scheduled for early discovery and trial.
41
 Setting firm trial dates was of 
great importance in influencing the parties to settle.
42
 Using the database, 
the Special Masters were able to suggest to Judge Hellerstein a rational 
mix of cases for the first trials.
43
 Taking into account many of the factors 
set forth above, Judge Hellerstein was able to choose plaintiffs along the 
age spectrum that reflected the goals that he had set: advancing the cases 
of those who appeared to be most severely injured by their work at the 
WTC site, as well as cases chosen by the parties as best suited to advance 
the claims, or defenses, they respectively advocated.
44
 Given the difficulty 
in identifying truly representative cases in such a varied plaintiff 
population, it became more practical to select cases for early trial that gave 
the parties some sense of their relative jeopardy should the cases go 
forward. 
II. CRITIQUING THE DATABASE 
Before undertaking a critique of the database used by both the court 
and (presumably) the parties in the 9/11 litigation, a partial disclaimer, of 
sorts, is in order. The Special Masters and Judge Hellerstein did not sit 
down by themselves and conjure the 368 fields of inquiry in the database. 
At all times the court and the Masters were sensitive to the fact that the 
parties should have the primary role in identifying the relevant questions. 
The Special Masters spent countless hours assisting in the negotiations 
regarding the make-up of the database fields.
45
 When the parties were at 
loggerheads, the Special Masters recommended or cajoled them into more 
sensible positions. For the most part the parties acceded to the Special 
Masters’ recommendations, expecting that Judge Hellerstein would agree 
 
 
 40. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 517–18 (2003). On 
March 11, 2010, the parties reached their initial settlement. Mireya Navarro, Federal Judge Orders 
More Talks on 9/11 Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A12. 
 41. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 503–05 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100, 2008 WL 793578, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 24, 2008) (order appointing technical advisor). 
 42. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 522–30. 
 43. Memorandum from Special Masters to Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein (Apr. 7, 2009) (on file 
with authors) [hereinafter Memo from Special Masters (Apr. 7)]. 
 44. See Order Identifying Cases for Trial, No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009). 
 45. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 522; Order Regarding 
Database Objections, No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/3
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with the Special Masters’ positions. When the plaintiffs and defense 
liaison counsel agreed that a question should be included, the Special 
Masters were reluctant to recommend that the judge reject the question. 
Based on hindsight, we may have been too deferential. Arguably, the 
Masters should have known that some of the database fields would likely 
be unhelpful to the resolution of the litigation, or be better handled in a 
subsequent phase involving intensive depositions of the plaintiffs whose 
claims had been selected for further proceedings. Given the large number 
of plaintiffs, every unneeded question propounded meant potentially 
10,000 unneeded responses, adding to burdens and expenses and 
potentially prolonging discovery. 
Now for some examples of what we believe to have been unnecessary 
questions posed to the plaintiffs in the database. Some of the excess may 
be explained by the fact that the questions eliciting answers that were 
integrated into the database were intended to replace the discovery 
function of interrogatories, and the parties wished to use the core 
discovery program to prepare for the more intensive depositions that were 
likely to follow. Consider the following in assessing how much 
information was enough: 
(1) Work background questions. A number of fields in the database 
went into considerable detail regarding the plaintiffs’ work experience. For 
example, were they trained for the tasks they were to perform at the WTC 
site?
46
 By whom and when did such training take place?
47
 If their 
employment had been terminated, what were the reasons for 
termination?
48
 More important questions concerning the terms of 
employment were contained in another section that asked when employees 
began working on the site,
49
 when they ceased working,
50
 and what was 
the total number of hours worked.
51
 The questions regarding how the 
plaintiffs were trained for their work elicited vague responses due to the 
passage of time and were ultimately unhelpful. 
(2) Availability and Use of Respiratory Equipment. Information with 
regard to the availability of respiratory equipment and how and under what 
conditions the equipment was used was valuable. It was widely believed 
that items of personal protection equipment were not readily available to 
 
 
 46. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 506–07. 
 47. Id. at 506. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 508. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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all who needed them and that the air filter canisters necessary to render 
them effective often were not replaced.
52
 To the extent that there was truth 
to these allegations, failure to provide the necessary equipment may well 
have violated provisions of the New York Labor law.
53
 The database 
included 58 questions, propounded to both plaintiffs and defendants, 
seeking information regarding who provided the respiratory equipment, 
the dates when they were provided, who trained the responders as to use of 
the equipment, and when such training took place.
54
 In retrospect, far 
fewer questions would have served the purpose. Questions inquiring into 
the dates and times a responder received a respirator were not of great 
significance. Furthermore, given that these questions were to be answered 
by plaintiffs at least seven years after their work at the WTC site ended, it 
was unlikely that their answers would be accurate. 
III. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE 9/11 DATABASE 
A. Controlling the Size of the Database 
The size of a litigation database depends heavily on the objectives the 
court and the parties want it to serve. If the objective is merely to choose 
representative cases for early discovery and trial, it is not necessary to 
create an elaborate database. If the primary objective is to encourage 
settlement, more information is necessary. If the settlement negotiations 
depend on complex categorizations of work histories and injuries, then 
still more information will have to be collected. And even more questions 
may be necessary if the database is intended to facilitate later discovery. 
Once the decision was made by Judge Hellerstein that a database was to be 
constructed, the parties proposed the inclusion of approximately 1,200 
fields.
55
 Such an expanded database might have served as a vehicle for 
more extensive discovery. The Special Masters chose to trim the database 
substantially from what the parties proposed.
56
 Indeed, as observed earlier, 
it could have been shorter still. Nonetheless, the database may have ended 
up near optimal size given the wide range of injuries, the varied nature of 
the exposures, and the many other variables that had to be taken into 
account. 
 
 
 52. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 533 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 53. Id. at 537–38. 
 54. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 508–09. 
 55. Telephone conversation between the Special Masters and the parties’ attorneys. 
 56. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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B. The Nature of the Questions to be Asked 
The purpose of the database in the 9/11 litigation was to provide easily 
retrievable, correlatable information.
57
 Whenever possible, the database 
avoided questions that called for a narrative response because textual 
narratives cannot be easily retrieved or correlated with other information. 
Instead, wherever feasible, the Special Masters formulated questions to 
elicit a yes-no response.
58
 Where that was not possible, multiple-choice 
responses were the best alternative.
59
 Another problem with narratives is 
that they tend not to be verifiable. The ability to objectively verify 
database answers is of great importance to the usefulness of the database. 
Given the large number of responses, it was important that the attorneys 
who sought to challenge the veracity of the answers could do so quickly. 
One of the strengths of the 9/11 database was that it called for specific 
answers regarding results from diagnostic medical tests.
60
 The tests relied 
upon were widely recognized as valid by prestigious medical authorities.
61
 
The results from these tests, when ranked on the Severity Chart, provided 
invaluable information that presented a general picture of the scope and 
intensity of the injuries suffered by the general plaintiff population.
62
 
IV. THE JUDGE’S AFTERWORD 
Neither the parties nor the court can manage 10,000 cases arising from 
a mass tort. Some method had to be devised to sample a manageable 
number, somehow thought to be reflective of the whole. Traditionally, 
sampling has been left to the attorneys, with the court selecting evenly 
from the proffered sample and favoring those for intensive discovery and 
trial. 
I did not wish to follow that model. In the 9/11 cases, over 90 percent 
of the plaintiffs were represented by a single set of lawyers. I came to the 
view, after considerable and unsuccessful efforts to order the attorneys to 
particularize their clients’ claims, that they could not, or would not, choose 
among their clients. I considered also that it would be unfair to select some 
 
 
 57. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100, 2008 WL 793578, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (order appointing technical advisor). 
 58. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig. 598 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
 59. The answers to certain questions were limited to a list of permissible answers called a pick-
list. Id. 
 60. See id. at 503. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Memo from Special Masters (Sept. 24), supra note 35. 
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cases for early proceedings and subject others that perhaps were needier 
and more pressing to long delays. And, without critical information about 
all the cases, I doubted that representative cases could be selected 
rationally, and felt concern that the outcome in a few cases could influence 
comprehensive settlements to unfair procedures and unfair recoveries. 
I determined, with the Special Masters, to develop a core discovery 
program that would allow all the cases to advance, efficiently and as 
rapidly as possible, to a point where a rational sample could be selected. 
That core discovery program had to have certain features: 
1. Each plaintiff had to swear to his answers, just as if they were 
responses to interrogatories. 
2. The lawyers had to have a stake in developing the database, to 
promote their cooperation and to reduce challenges. 
3. Claims of injury had to be based on quantitative medically-
approved tests. Subjective diagnoses, although not precluded, 
were to be answered separately. 
4. The questions had to elicit answers in a form that was 
susceptible to computer coding. 
5. The database that would be formed was to be independently 
maintained, with costs to be shared by counsel, and was to be 
accessible to all counsel and to the court and special masters. 
6. Answers by the parties had to be served in case sequence, to 
assure that all cases were accounted for and that all plaintiffs 
were willing and able to proceed further. Failures to respond 
would be punished by dismissals for failure to prosecute. 
7. Cases for further and more intensive discovery and trial would 
be selected at pre-set intervals, as data for groups of 2,000 cases 
in index number sequence were processed and made accessible. 
8. The requirement of sworn answers by each responding plaintiff, 
and counsel’s awareness that a certain number of plaintiffs 
would have their answers tested in depositions, assured the 
integrity and reliability of the process (to the extent that there 
could be such assurance). Subjecting the sampled plaintiffs to 
depositions would be expected to assure the reliability and 
integrity of their answers and, by extension, provide a measure 
for assessing the credibility of all plaintiffs’ responses collected 
in the database. 
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The questions, the overall process, and the integration of the process 
into a firm schedule leading inexorably to trials of the sampled cases are 
described in a published opinion.
63
 I have no question that the discipline 
imparted by the program, the information gleaned from the database, and, 
most importantly, the evaluations expressed in the initial report of the 
Special Masters
64
 led to the comprehensive settlement of the cases, ratified 
by over 99 percent of the plaintiffs opting into the settlement. 
This exercise, merging judicial management and control of the 
litigation processes with the autonomy of each side’s attorneys in 
prosecuting and defending their cases, I believe, created a process that was 
fair, efficient, and economical. The initial costs—sharing the time and 
expenses of the Special Masters and developing a comprehensive 
database—could be high but, I believed, would be economical in the long 
run, and much less expensive than normal discovery processes. Bringing 
the whole mass of cases to a point where they could be subsumed in a 
comprehensive settlement, much earlier than otherwise would be possible, 
with recovery fairly spread over cases of varying severity and merit, fixed 
and distributed in a fair and transparent process, provided extraordinary 
benefits to the litigants and to the judicial system. The database made all 
of this possible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding its imperfections, we believe that the 9/11 database 
served the court well. It generated a large amount of searchable and 
correlatable information within a short time frame. It allowed the court 
rationally to choose appropriate representative plaintiffs for early 
discovery and trial.
65
 Judge Hellerstein was able to set firm trial dates for a 
large number of sampled plaintiffs (thus exerting pressure on the parties to 
settle or else face the uncertainties of trial), one following immediately 
after the other until values could be established and resolutions reached.
66
 
The court made the memoranda authored by the Special Masters based on 
the database available on its website, thus allowing the plaintiffs and the 
 
 
 63. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 64. Memo from Special Masters (Sept. 24), supra note 35. 
 65. Memo from Special Masters (Apr. 7), supra note 43; see also Order Identifying Cases for 
Trial, No. 21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009). 
 66. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 503–05. 
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media to get a good glimpse at the scope of the entire litigation.
67
 On the 
one hand, the fact that fewer than one-quarter of the plaintiffs had suffered 
arguably severe injuries and that a third had suffered no discernible 
injuries at all
68
 helped everyone to understand that, for a majority of 
plaintiffs, there would be no pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. On the 
other hand, the database pressured the parties to settle the cases involving 
serious injury on equitable terms. Judge Hellerstein rejected the first 
settlement package presented by the parties and encouraged the parties to 
increase the compensation to the plaintiffs.
69
 Ultimately, over $100 million 
was added to the settlement, $50 million from an additional contribution 
by the Captive Insurance Company, and approximately $50 million by the 
reduction of attorney fees to plaintiffs’ counsel.70 Additional benefits came 
from forgivenesses of liens, by the City and a large number of 
compensation and disability insurance carriers. And even more sums were 
paid in settlements by the Port Authority and various contractors and 
insurers who were not embraced by the settlements with the City. In no 
small part, Judge Hellerstein was able to insist on these increases and 
facilitated the additional settlements because he was in possession of the 
information provided by the database. The final outcome should give 
encouragement to those in the future who may contemplate using a 
database to help resolve complex litigation.
71
 
 
 
 67. See U. S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, http://www.nysd.us 
courts.gov/sept11 (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (The majority of Judge Hellerstein’s orders and opinions 
were posted on the court’s website.). 
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100 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010) (“In my judgment, this settlement is not enough.”); Navarro, supra note 
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 70. Order Acknowledging, and Setting Hearing on, Modified and Improved Agreement of 
Settlement, Nos. 21 MC 100, 21 MC 102, 21 MC 103 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010); DEPALMA, supra 
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